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Abstract 
This paper focuses on contemporary challenges to the human security 
framework through an examination of asymmetrical conflict generated 
by extremist insurgents, specifically Al Shabaab in Kenya. The political 
and security dynamics generated by extremist groups often find re-
inforcement in local contestations over power and territory, resulting in 
an interaction between local and 'external'. It is the product of these in-
teractions in the form of opportunities, resultant discourses, responses 
and what they offer to an expansion of normative ideas about human 
security and conflict that this paper focuses on. Using Kenya as a case 
study, this paper explores the interface between the growth of Al 
Shabaab, securitisation of governance and political elite consensus on 
the policy relationship between human security versus a state security 
model. This paper pursues the argument that the rise in the intensity 
and nature of Al Shabaab attacks in Kenya has influenced the inter-
pretation of the country's security threats and the application of strategies. 
Rather than aiding the application of human security as central to na-
tional security, it has rolled back previous gains.  
1. Introduction 
The post-Cold War period has seen a shift from inter-state wars to intra- 
state armed conflict as the dominant form of military conflict in the inter-
national system. In the last decade, a dimension of intra-state conflict 
has gained increasing prominence. Where large-scale violence and in-
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securities have occurred, they are increasingly associated with insur-
gency groups and asymmetrical conflict such as in Afghanistan, Syria, 
Libya, Mali and Somalia. The rise of extremist groups that are trans-
national and trans-continental in nature, such as Al Shabaab in East 
Africa, Boko Haram in Nigeria, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), 
Mouvement pour l'unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest (MUJAO) 
have complicated the peace and conflict terrain. The proliferation of 
extremist insurgent groups has influenced both the discourse and 
application of conflict resolution frameworks, especially for states in the 
Horn of Africa and the Sahel, that have borne the brunt of an increase 
in diverse groups that pledge sympathy and/or act in solidarity with the 
global network — Al Qaeda and today Islamic State of Iraq and Levant 
(ISIL).  
Conventional definitions of insurgency have subsequently 
changed in the last decade due to the financial, military and ideological 
support that extremist insurgent groups draw from both the populace 
and global networks. Some scholars describe these new insurgencies 
as new wars, shaped by the inability of the state to discharge its basic 
functions such as the maintenance of peace and security, to act as a 
neutral arbiter in competing public claims, provider of the public goods 
and amenities or become an engine of development (See Buncker 
2005; Dartnell 2006 and Salehyan 2009). Social factors such as ethnicity, 
religion and identity politics, which become a basis for claims made 
against regimes, reflect a crisis in state and nation making. In identifying 
land or territory as a key resource or basis for making demands for 
independence, these movements reflect the failure of states in this 
region to create a consensus in belonging within the borders of nation-
statehood. In effect, debates on security, conflict resolution and peace-
building are being tested significantly due to this shift in the peace and 
security landscape. 
As a result of the context above, two sets of conversations have 
converged and dominated normative approaches to peace and conflict. 
The first is the evolution of a peacebuilding agenda through An Agenda 
for Peace in 1992, which was an effort to develop a coordinated inter-
national approach to peace making and conflict resolution efforts 
(Boutros-Ghali 1992). The Boutros-Ghali led Agenda for Peace co-
incided with debates on human security, a concept, which is noted to 
be one of the most significant shifts in the way that security has been 
understood since the end of the Cold War. While the history of human 
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security can be traced to the growing dissatisfaction with prevailing 
notions of development and security in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, it 
was only in the early 1990s that an explicitly human security perspect-
ive was articulated with some rigour. The 1994 United Nations Human 
Development Report highlighted the importance of the shift to the 
individual, noting that the real security threats were associated with 
poverty. However, the stabilisation approach to peacebuilding that gained 
currency post the September 2001 terror attacks in the United States 
(US) has complicated the place of the individual as an important 
fulcrum for security.  
Stabilisation as a framework, particularly, in the post 9/11 en-
vironment has been characterised by an emphasis on ensuring stable 
secure states, expressed through well-policed borders. The aim is to 
manage the localisation and therefore the diffusion of terror networks 
into the Global North. Consequently, the coercive power of the state 
has become key, resulting in the conflation and rise of militarisation as 
peacebuilding (See Curtis & Dzinesa 2012). One of the most prominent 
ways in which this has been manifested in Africa is through two 
American led initiatives. The Pan Sahel Counter Terrorism Initiative 
(PSI) — now Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership and Opera-
tion Enduring Freedom — initiated in November 2002 was designed to 
protect borders, track movement of people, combat terrorism, and en-
hance regional cooperation and stability. PSI targeted Mali, Niger, Chad, 
and Mauritania and was argued to respond to suspicious movement of 
people and goods across and within their borders through training, 
equipment and cooperation. The initiative's goals merged with US na-
tional security interests in Africa: waging the war on terrorism and en-
hancing regional peace and security (Ellis 2004). US Africa Command 
(AfriCOM) on the other hand was spearheaded by the Bush admin-
istration to "ensure security and interventions to prevent war and con-
flicts, which by full operation should have military bases across 53 
countries in Africa" (Ganzle 2011). The securitisation of development, 
which these two initiatives argue to be their approach — no security 
without development and vice versa — has been contested with con-
cerns raised about America's push towards using military power against 
states that "threaten the US national security" and AfriCOM operating 
with little oversight from Congress or international bodies like the United 
Nations' (UN) (See Kidane 2008; Mesfin 2009; Gänzle 2011).  
The stabilisation approach has implications for the already con-
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tested realm of human security. In the same way that peacebuilding 
frameworks have been challenged for their prescriptive nature and fail-
ing to account for local peculiarities and conflict realities, the human 
security framework has been the site of much debate. Taken together, 
the stabilisation approach to peacebuilding and the human security 
framework, find a ready critique through scholars who argue that both 
frameworks offer the West an opportunity to assert control over the 
developing world in order to protect itself from disorder emanating from 
the South (Paris 2001; Cilliers 2004). The expansive nature of both con-
cepts and the related problem of measurement and definition challenge 
their applicability.  
The conceptual and practical tensions become more pronounced 
when placed in the context of ongoing extremist insurgencies across 
sections of Africa and in this case Kenya. Granted, the ideals contained 
within the human security framework such as protection from the threat 
of disease, hunger, employment, crime, social conflict and political re-
pression find validation as triggers and root causes of rising extremism. 
However, in making a link between security and human development 
there is a growing appreciation of the borderless nature of security 
challenges generated by extremism in particular. Conflict and its impact 
are interdependent, spreading beyond the confines of affected states. 
States therefore have to collectively and robustly reflect on what con-
stitutes the security problem: security for whom, security based on 
which values, security from what threats, and security by what means? 
(Cilliers 2004; Gasper 2008). In doing this, the social contract continues 
to be tested in many contexts, leading to a reconstruction of the ways in 
which governments and citizens engage. It is on the interface between 
citizen and regime engagement that this article focuses. 
This article analyses the role of asymmetrical conflict in Kenya, in 
opening up state-centric security approaches to public debate and 
consequently pushing for increased accountability to citizens. To do 
this, it focuses on two broad questions. It begins by examining the inter-
section between state security and human security as part of a national 
security strategy. The second is the discursive and practical tension in 
making a case for an inverse relationship between increased socio-
economic security and reduced military spending in order to address 
the threat of violent extremism locally. In this regard, the relationship be-
tween elite consensus on the origins and resolution of security threats 
will also be examined. The findings of the 2008 Commission of Inquiry 
Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 37, No 1                                                                Awino Okech 
57 
 
on Post Election Violence (CIPEV) on security sector reform framed by 
the Westgate terror attack in September 2013 and its aftermath is used 
as the basis of the analysis in this article.  
2.  Security sector reform in Kenya: A brief 
overview 
The expansion of security sector reform debates in Kenya occurred 
after the Commission of Inquiry on Post Election Violence (CIPEV) 
recommended extensive police reforms (See CIPEV 2008). The police 
service was targeted because they were adversely implicated in extra-
judicial killings, rape and other human rights abuses during the post-
election crisis. It is important to note though, that discussions on profes-
sionalising the police service have been part of policy conversations 
between actors in the security sector and various governments since 
1992. These 'insider' conversations have focused on two main areas. 
The first area was driven by a concern with the conditions of service, 
which included a review of remuneration, institutional hardware such as 
facilities and equipment and software such as issues of recruitment, 
training, retention and career progression. The second area dealt with 
strengthening the rule of law. It is in this area that a significant amount 
of civil society support has been directed through diverse forms of 
human rights compliance trainings for police officers (See Omeje & 
Githigaro 2012).  
The CIPEV recommendations catapulted these efforts through 
the creation of a National Task Force on Police Reforms in May 2009, 
which was mandated to make proposals for police reform in the 
country. Some of the major changes included the development of the 
National Police Service Act passed in August 2011, which merged the 
Kenya Police and the Administration Police into one hierarchy and 
established the role of Inspector General of Police with authority over 
both policing branches. The Act also placed limits on the use of force by 
police, stipulating that an officer may use "force and firearms, only as is 
necessary" (See Government of Kenya 2011). A civilian board was also 
established to oversee recruitment and appointments of police officers, 
review standards and qualifications, and receive complaints from the 
public and refer them to the Independent Policing Oversight Authority 
(IPOA) and other government entities (Government of Kenya 2011). 
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However, by March 2013 there were increasing calls by the Inspector 
General of Police to increase the powers given to him. More worrying 
was the call to empower the police to exercise more force (HRW 2013). 
These calls were indicative, as would be expected, of operational dif-
ficulties between the civilian oversight bodies and the police hierarchy. 
However, they were also framed against an increase in insurgency at-
tacks in the country as well as generalised insecurity such as home 
invasions, rape and car-jacking. Increasing the power allocated to the 
Inspector General of Police and democratising the use of force by the 
police would move away from the initial spirit of the constitution, which 
was to manage excessive, unsupervised police power. Civilian oversight 
was intended to increase accountability to citizens to whom services 
are provided. 
3.  The Westgate siege in context 
The staggered efforts at security sector reform were disrupted by the 
Westgate terror attack on 21 September 2013, which was described as 
a retaliatory action by Al Shabaab for Kenya's military incursion into 
Somalia. Operation Linda Nchi (protect the country), was a coordinated 
military operation between the militaries of Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia 
that began on 16 October 2011 into Southern Somali territory occupied 
by Al Shabaab. The initial military operation has since been absorbed 
into the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).  
The history of transnational terrorist actions in Kenya can be 
traced back to the first bus park attack in 1975 and escalated in 1998 
with the Al Qaeda attack on the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es 
Salaam. These attacks cannot be read outside international global 
power politics and retaliations against US allies. The rise of Al Shabaab 
must also be situated in this context and can be traced to the forced 
dissolution of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in 2007. The ICU was a 
loose formation of Islamic judicial systems created in mid-2004 that 
managed to restore some sort of civil order after years of a violent 
anarchy in Somalia and received significant support from the Somali 
people (Wise 2011). ICU had taken over most of southern Somalia in 
the second half of 2006 and was in direct opposition to the Transitional 
Federal Government that was more palatable to actors internally and in 
the sub-region (Wise 2011). Al Shabaab was the militant wing of the 
ICU. In December 2006 and January 2007, Somali government and 
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Ethiopian forces supported by the international actors rooted out the 
ICU formation but the radical Al Shabaab retreated into the South 
(Wise 2011; START 2013).  
Prior to Kenya's incursion into Somalia in 2011 through Opera-
tion Linda Nchi, research demonstrates that what existed in Kenya 
were sleeper cells and increased local radicalisation rather than an 
overt Al Shabaab presence. Kenya as a site of Al Shabaab fury is noted 
to be rooted in Al Shabaab's claim to a historical Pan Somalia project 
but has found mobilisation capacity in deep rooted state-society fragility 
including state institutional weaknesses (Botha 2014; ICG 2014). Since 
2011 and prior to the Westgate mall attack, Al Shabaab targets were 
diverse, ranging from bars in downtown Nairobi, to crowded bus ter-
minals and churches, and the majority of their casualties and targets 
have been civilians at 25,9 per cent with military targets constituting 
22,4 per cent (START 2013: 2). 
The Westgate attack was considered significant in comparison 
to previous Al Shabaab claimed attacks, largely due to its target, an 
upmarket mall on a weekend, the number of casualties and the fact 
that its evolution revealed sophisticated preparation by the assailants. 
The siege resulted in four days of combined engagement between the 
police, army and other special security forces and the assailants. At the 
end of the four days and to date there remains haziness about the 
number of assailants and whether there was sufficient actionable intelli-
gence that could have averted the crisis. Of importance to this article 
though is what the management of the siege revealed about the state 
of security management in Kenya. The Westgate siege illuminated his-
torical structural and institutional weaknesses related to national security 
thinking and the sector charged with its delivery.  
The first layer of historical weaknesses is structural in nature and 
evident in the space created for militia groups non-aligned to Al Shabaab 
groups to thrive. For instance, there is consensus that the rise of the 
Mungiki coincided with the return to a multi-party democracy in Kenya 
and accompanying state-sponsored ethnic violence across sections of 
the country between 1991 and 1994. Scholars argue that it is this polit-
ical environment that provided Mungiki with fertile ground for recruit-
ment from the large numbers of displaced people (Kagwanja 2005; 
Rutere 2008). Rutere notes that while Mungiki's presence was initially 
strongest among the displaced Kikuyu it quickly spread to the low-
income areas of Nairobi particularly the slum areas where it established 
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a stronghold due to a crisis in public security (2008: 8). Nonetheless, 
while the political transition may have provided an incubator for the 
movement to grow, Rutere argues that the politics of vigilantism and viol-
ence in which Mungiki was implicated makes it difficult for the move-
ment to be characterised as part of a global agenda or a voice of the 
masses but one in which a political moment helped deepen their patron
–client relations with the Kenyan African National Union (KANU) elite 
(Rutere 2008). 
Some of these groups' histories are rooted in political elite machin-
ations to manage opposition, consolidate support through widespread 
insecurity while others are embedded in historical water and pastoral 
conflicts some of them across borders such as those amongst the 
Pokot and Karamajong communities of the Rift Valley in Kenya. In this 
regard, the November 2012 death of 42 police officers that were part of 
a police operation in Suguta Valley to address escalated cattle rustling 
between the Samburu and Turkana communities illustrates the extent 
of structural decay (See Amnesty 2013; Ronoh 2014). Cattle rustling in 
this region has increasingly grown violent over the years due to the 
emergence of better armed local militia groups resulting in increased 
fatalities. Subsequent investigations into the incident revealed that most 
of the officers involved in the operation were newly recruited and that 
there had been no clear commander of the operation, nor provision of 
adequate equipment (Amnesty 2013; Ronoh 2014). 
Weaknesses such as those evident in the Suguta Valley attack 
have resulted in two main approaches to local security provisioning. 
The first is that in which citizens in collusion with security officers from 
whom they contract licensed firearms heighten a militarised approach 
to resolving local matters that arise from state absence. Second, is the 
existence of organised criminal gangs using insecurity as a means to 
extract goods from the population and in some instances to create a 
subaltern security apparatus. In addition, the high levels of corruption 
within the force and weaknesses in border management and enforce-
ment have led to the proliferation of unlicensed arms in the hands of 
civilians. Like the Westgate siege, the Suguta Valley case points to a 
security apparatus that is ill-equipped on multiple fronts to respond to 
daily incidences of insecurity let alone those that arise from extremism. 
The structural challenges within the police force not only speak to the 
institutional decay that if invested in would deal with basic operational 
procedures and build morale that leaves those in service and the 
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society more vulnerable. Insecurity in effect is bred from within. The co-
ordination question in Baragoi and Westgate reflects a relational dys-
function across the security sector on the one hand but also a chasm 
between the sector and the citizenry on the other hand.  
The second layer of structural and institutional weaknesses con-
cerns the extent of security sector reform, which hitherto focused on the 
police but had failed to capture with the same veracity other parts of the 
sector. In question here is the intersection between internal security, 
border management and territorial integrity. Border management is the 
Achilles heel of Kenya and other countries that bear the brunt of ex-
tremist insurgents. While insurgents find socio-economic deprivation as 
catalysts for recruitment and proselytising, this is enhanced by the 
absence of state machinery in sections of the country, which are often 
far away from the centre and border other countries. State absence 
refers to the lack of basic service delivery whether this is education, 
water, health, sanitation, infrastructure and security. Some of the most 
vulnerable entry points for extremists in Kenya have been the coastal 
strip and the Northern part of the country. There are two important 
dynamics worth noting in relation to these two areas. The first dynamic 
is connected to the low levels of socio-economic development in these 
regions largely due to successive regime neglect and political patron-
age. The second dynamic is shaped by the proximity of the Coast and 
North East Kenya to Somalia, which has had a protracted internal civil 
conflict. Kenya has borne the brunt of Somalia's extended civil war not 
only as a refugee receiving country but also through conflict generated 
dynamics such as the increased illegal sale of small arms and light 
weapons.  
Topographically, the coastal area also features small islands and 
forests that allow for easy access to the mainland with minimal detec-
tion. These contextual factors have therefore shaped the space for 
extremist groups to operate. Botha highlights the ways in which specific 
actors allied to Al Qaeda have historically used the Coast of Kenya as a 
rear base. Botha refers to the movement of Al Qaeda operatives in 
Kenya from as early as 1993, such as Khalid al-Fawwaz who would 
later become a spokesperson for Bin Laden in Britain to Abu Ubaidah 
al-Banshiri, one of Al Qaeda's military commanders to Muhammad Atef 
in 1994 who would be killed during the US bombing of Afghanistan in 
November 2001 (Botha 2013: 17). Al Qaeda established bases in Lamu 
and Ras Kiamboni, along the Kenyan–Somali border by 1996 (Botha 
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2013: 18). These movements find reinforcement in historical exclusion 
in these areas. 
4.  An overview of North Eastern Province 
and the Coastal Belt  
The exclusion of Northern Frontier District (NFD) as it was called was 
an inherited problem from the colonial government. The British colonial 
government designated the NFD as a closed area through the Outlying 
District Ordinance of 1902, which restricted both residents' movement 
and the relationship of the centre to the region. Additional legislation, 
which included, the Special Districts (Administration) Ordinance of 1934 
and the Stock Theft and Produce Ordinance of 1933 gave colonial 
administrators extensive powers of arrest, restraint, detention, and 
seizure of property of 'hostile tribes' (KHRC nd: 80). At the beginning of 
the Lancaster House talks on Kenya's independence Constitution, a 
delegation of Somali leaders stated their desire to have NFD secede to 
Somalia to join the Greater Somalia, which would encompass all those 
areas in which people of Somali origin were found. Greater Somalia 
would therefore span Somalia, Somaliland, Ogaden in Ethiopia, North 
Eastern Kenya and Djibouti (Castagno 1964; Turton 1972). The con-
testations that emerged in the immediate post-independence era be-
tween the Kenyatta regime and Somalis who bought into the irredentist 
project led by the Northern Province Peoples Progressive Party must 
be understood against this background (Wanambisi 1984; Mburu 1999: 
99). However, the post-independence regime's response was brutal 
through a continuation of draconian colonial laws in addition to new 
legislation that gave Jomo Kenyatta power to rule the region by decree 
and enlarged emergency powers. The government imposed emergency 
rule in the region, which was only lifted in 1992 (KHRC nd: 22).  
Emergency rule led to decades of state harassment, which in-
cluded Somali leaders being routinely placed in extended 'preventive 
detention', the creation of protected villages and continued restriction of 
entry and exit into the region (TJRC 2013: 12-13). The impact of histor-
ical juridical and applied segregation of North Eastern Kenya has had 
specific ramifications for the relationship between extremist insurgency, 
exclusion and border control. One of the most central complaints from 
residents in North Eastern Kenya relates to the difficulties associated 
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with getting national identity cards, which demands extra vetting of 
residents of the region. While specific data is hard to come by, anec-
dotal evidence suggests that those with Islamic names generally requir-
ing additional rigorous vetting in order to acquire identity cards than 
those with Kenyan or European names (KHRC nd: 34-35). The insist-
ence on vetting border communities as a security measure has created 
room for corruption since government authorities rely on local elders to 
determine the authenticity of the claimants, a process that has become 
open to manipulation. The net effect of vetting is the blanket perception 
that all Somalis are illegal immigrants or refugees and not that they are 
legitimate Kenyan citizens have a right to access effective and efficient 
services from the State (See TJRC, 2013). 
In addition, Kenya's North Eastern province is largely pastoral 
and until recently rural with a rapid urbanisation trend in the last dec-
ade. These factors have increased communal competition over scarce 
resources resulting in pastoral and clan related conflicts. Clan related 
conflicts in the area are heightened by reinforcements from actors in 
other countries — Ethiopia, and Somalia — who come with better 
armament, aided by weak border management and complicated by 
shared communal ties. The pariah status conferred on the region by 
successive regimes has, however, resulted in an increase in cross-
border commerce from Somalia to Kenya as well as robust local and 
informal conflict management and security systems. Local communities 
have relied on informal systems of protection that involve a combination 
of clan systems and militias. Weak border management has created an 
environment of lawlessness and fluidity of movement driven by the 
need to access resources on the Kenyan side. Aided by corruption, this 
lawlessness has heightened the blanket branding of Somalis in the 
recent past as a major source of insecurity (See USAID nd).  
The coastal end of the country on the other hand has been the 
site of historical land dispossession, which can be traced to three inter-
related processes. The first was the acquisition of land for the creation 
of a protectorate, the second was the imposition of English property law 
with titling and private property rights, which provided a juridical context 
for land appropriation and the third was the land reform process in the 
immediate post-independence period (Kanyinga 2009: 325). All of these 
factors put together have had an impact on efforts to address land 
tenure questions in Kenya generally. For the Coast in particular, eco-
nomic and political exigencies guided the establishment of settlement 
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schemes in the Coast by creating a distinction between land for agricul-
tural production and land for settlement. Politically, settlement efforts 
were driven by the need to manage violent conflict arising from land-
lessness. However, land expropriation in the Coast, instead of resolving 
indigenous communities' land thirst, led to the acquisition of land for 
and by non-locals at the expense of historically dispossessed com-
munities — the Mjikenda (See Kanyinga 2009; CRA, 2012).  
The institutionalisation of political patronage as a means for 
accessing land rights has been a factor in the re-distribution, acquisition 
and settlement of local landless communities. The discrimination has 
been evident in the provision of land titles to non-indigenous com-
munities while locals who have occupied and used land are unable to 
claim ownership through juridical means, which supersedes occupa-
tion. It is noted that in one settlement scheme — Mpeketoni — 95 per 
cent of the occupants are Kikuyu who were resettled in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s by President Jomo Kenyatta upon expulsion from 
Tanzania after the collapse of the first East Africa Community (EAC). 
The settlers were issued with title deeds during the Moi era while in 
neighbouring Mkunumbi, indigenous communities have no legal land 
titles (See CRA 2012: 19). Mpeketoni was the site of a brutal overnight 
attack between 15 June and 17 June 2014. More than 60 people were 
killed in attacks in and near the area. Al Shabaab claimed responsibility 
but President Kenyatta insisted that these were attacks organised by 
local politicians with ties to a network of gangs. Over the years, counter-
patronage strategies, which include resisting forced evictions, have 
been adopted by local communities to ascertain ownership rights and 
enforce re-distribution of land, but these have not resolved the tensions 
that land dispossession has created in this region.  
The combination of the dynamics discussed above contributed 
to the formation of radical political parties such as the Islamic Party of 
Kenya, which emerged during the re-introduction of multi-party politics 
in Kenya in 1992 and more recently in cessation ambitions through the 
Mombasa Republican Council. However, the link made between Islam 
as a religion and extremism has contributed in great measure to these 
groups being proscribed in Kenya, leading to greater disgruntlement 
rather than reducing it. The fact that citizens in these forgotten regions 
have developed resilience and survival mechanisms despite the state 
reinforces distrust of state machinery when and if they intervene. In 
fact, in most cases, reliance and trust in neighbouring states is en-
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hanced by shared cultural factors. In the last five years, Northern Kenya 
and the Coast have assumed greater value due to the combination of 
the discovery of hydrocarbons and infrastructure development. Both 
northern Kenya and eastern Somaliland are sites of some of the most 
promising hydrocarbon exploration in East Africa. Northern Kenya is the 
site of four hydrocarbon basins — Lokichar, Anza, Mandera, and Lamu. 
(See IEA 2014). In addition, Northern Kenya is set to benefit from Lamu 
Port and Lamu Southern Sudan Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) project 
which is intended as a new road network, rail line, oil pipeline, oil re-
finery at Lamu; a new free port at Lamu; a resort city in Isiolo; and inter-
national airports at Isiolo and Lamu. This major transportation and in-
vestment corridor running through northern Kenya is also designed to 
move oil from South Sudan to the Lamu refinery, increase cross-border 
trade with South Sudan and Ethiopia (Kenya Vision 2030)  
The examples above point to both the limitations and complex 
relationship between the various arms of the security sector charged 
with homeland, state security, the justice sector and weak state capabilit-
ies. State capabilities here refers to a legitimate monopoly of the means 
of violence; effective administrative control; management of public 
finances; investment in human capital; delineation of citizenship rights 
and duties; provision of infrastructure; formation of the market; manage-
ment of the state's assets (including the environment, natural re-
sources, and cultural assets); international relations and the means to 
enforce the rule of law (Migdal 1988).  
5.  Elite consensus versus national sentiment 
The complex historical and contemporary dynamics that have shaped 
socio-economic exclusion and provided a basis for linkages to global 
narratives on terror, also find reinforcement in competing state interests. 
These political elite interests are evident in the measures taken to re-
solve extremist insurgency, general insecurity and manage a compact 
with citizens. These interests have emerged in a number of ways. The 
first way is through the extent of extremist attacks in Kenya, which have 
offered political elites an opportunity to de-legitimise and de-politicise 
the claims and grievances of opposition groups by branding them as 
allied to terrorists. This approach by the state was most pronounced 
after the Mpeketoni attack in 2014 and highlights the potential of polit-
ical and strategic motivations for labeling. (See ICG 2014; Okari 2014; 
Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 37, No 1                                                                Awino Okech 
66 
 
Wambua-Soi 2014). More importantly, questions have been raised 
around the role of natural resources and greater resource extraction 
opportunities as noted above as a driver of conflict by powerful actors 
within and without Kenya. The support of terror networks directly and 
indirectly by enabling corruption and weak state capabilities therefore 
services corporate interests that thrive on lawlessness1) (See Menkaus 
2014). 
Second, counter-terrorism work has provided a strategic motiva-
tion to re-calibrate security sector reform. This has occurred in two 
ways. First, in June 2014 in the aftermath of the Mpeketoni attack, the 
President placed security personnel and equipment of the Kenya 
Wildlife Service, the Kenya Forest Services, the Kenya Prisons Service 
and the National Youth Service under the command of the Inspector 
General of Police in order to improve coordination and response to 
security emergencies (PSCU 2014). The tendency to increase opera-
tional capacity as a critical part of security sector reform efforts, par-
ticularly during moments of crisis, often occurs at the expense of 
accountability and effectiveness. In addition, increasing operational 
capacity is not always diagnostically aligned with the operational needs 
of the force in question, which includes the capabilities of the forces, the 
nature of the security problem at hand and the security needs of citizens. 
It is often triggered by a show of might — "boots on the ground" mental-
ity. For instance, one of the assertions that have been made with 
regard to police reform has been the need to increase the ratio of police 
to citizens, which stood at 1:1 000 in 2010 (See Kenyatta 2015; Omeje 
& Githigaro 2012). Yet a response to terror is not necessarily about the 
number of security personnel as the attacks in Kenya have demon-
strated but a combination of intelligence gathering, winning hearts and 
minds, and effective and efficient responses to situations and through 
capabilities and skill (Njagih 2015).  
Second, increasing operational capacity has also been accom-
panied by heightened involvement of the Kenyan Defence Forces (KDF) 
in internal security. Although there is no legal breach, the oversight 
responsibility over KDF lies with the Joint Parliamentary Committee on 
Administration and National Security and Defence and Foreign Rela-
tions as well as with the National Security Council. However, an 
examination of the oversight function of these committees reveals ex-
tensive limitations. Two examples are illustrative. In October 2011, an 
intelligence Bill cascaded through parliament without much debate. A 
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citizen-led watchdog platform pointed out the process flaws and there-
fore operational loopholes inherent in what is now an Act. Unlike other 
Bills the National Intelligence Service Bill 2011 did not go through a 
process of Cabinet approval. The Bill originated from the National Se-
curity Intelligence Service (NSIS) and went straight to the Constitution 
Implementation Commission (CIC) bypassing the Cabinet. "The Assist-
ant Internal Security Minister Orwa Ojode recently stated that his 
Ministry, the Ministry of Internal Security, had not even received the bill. 
He stated that Cabinet could not interfere with matters of defence and 
security" (Majiwa 2011)  
The reforms initiated under the constitutional review process in 
2010, led to the National Intelligence Service (NIS) transforming into a 
disciplined civilian service with no prosecutorial power. There were 
efforts to give the NIS greater investigative power with a raft of amend-
ments to security related legislation under the Security Laws Amend-
ment Act 2014. The amendments to the NIS Act among others Acts 
were withheld in a court ruling. However, if passed the laws would have 
granted NIS the power to conduct "covert operations" on any security 
threats identified. These wide ranging changes were a direct response 
to the Mpeketoni attack, which was deemed to be locally instigated yet 
responsibility was claimed by Al Shabaab. 
In September 2013, the joint parliamentary oversight committee 
investigating weaknesses in the management of Westgate attack 
emerged with a report that cited all other actors within the security 
sector except those that were actually involved in the actual manage-
ment of the crisis — the police and military. The parliamentary report 
was subsequently rejected due to its recommendations that were broad 
and unwieldy in nature including the arbitrary closure of the Dadaab 
refugee camp, which is perceived as a terrorist hub, the construction of 
a perimeter fence with Somalia and retaliatory attacks on Al Shabaab 
strongholds in Somalia (See Olick 2014). Security analysts have noted 
the opportunities for wide-scale corruption within defence contracting 
such as the 1999 arms deal scandal in South Africa (See Todor 2014). 
In addition, limited oversight over defence contracting has the potential 
to result in inappropriate equipment as well as budgetary and opera-
tional inefficiency. The policy "on a need to know basis" continues to 
serve as a veil for massive loopholes in the democratic governance of 
the defence forces.  
Further, the 2012 Prevention of Terrorism Act which was passed 
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after massive debate and restructuring due to fears of religious and 
ethnic profiling was re-opened for review in the national assembly in the 
wake of the Westgate siege. More recently a raft of amendments under 
the contentious Security Amendment Act 2014, furthered the coercive 
nature of the state by increasing state surveillance and prosecutorial 
powers (Security Amendment Act 2014). A number of the contentious 
provisions such as those limiting the freedom of speech and expression 
especially as pertains to the media, those related to the Refugee Act 
and criminal procedures connected to evidence collection were sus-
pended after a legal petition (Mzalendo 2015).  
Cumulatively, these efforts have contributed to increasing exclu-
sion rather than enhancing inclusion. The measures, which are in-
tended strengthen the State's legitimate monopoly of violence have 
instead shored up a securitisation approach and de-emphasised a 
focus on the drivers of youth radicalisation in Africa, which include socio- 
economic and political exclusion (See Gow et al 2013; Botha 2013). 
Efforts such as Nyumba Kumi and Usalama Watch are illustrative. 
Nyumba Kumi (literal translation from Kiswahili — ten houses) was 
developed by the Ministry of Interior as a national security awareness 
mechanism after the Westgate terror attack to operate through cluster-
ing households based on security needs in their localities. It is roughly 
based on the notion of community policing but extends this through 
legislative requirements that demand greater policing of tenants and 
neighbours by household owners, associations and neighbours. Usalama 
Watch on the other hand was a police operation intended to weed out 
Al Shabaab sympathisers across Kenya after a bomb exploded in 
Eastleigh in March 2014 — a neighbourhood predominantly occupied 
by Somalis. The operation ended up focusing on Somalis and on 
Eastleigh with major complaints about police conduct and human rights 
abuses (Amnesty 2014; IPOA, nd). Instead of bridging the gap be-
tween the security providers and the citizens they have instead 
widened the gap due to the allegations of unethical conduct of police 
officers as well as religious and ethnic profiling of the Somali community 
and Muslims. 
6.  Conclusion 
The reflections from Kenya above, point to the need to re-visit assump-
tions inherent in the application of human security, which in praxis has 
Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 37, No 1                                                                Awino Okech 
69 
 
been pursued as separate to, rather than a complimentary and critical 
part of national security. The rise of extremist insurgency and counter-
terrorism efforts affirm the centrality of human security approaches yet 
complicates it. The complication arises from the concomitant commit-
ment of massive resources required to resolve socio-economic and 
political exclusion which are often long-term in nature, and short-term 
yet heavy investments needed in security personnel and infrastructure.  
Kenya can either deal robustly with the dual question of terrorism 
and internal security or run the risk of alienating a populace that 
considers both the security architecture and its leadership lacking in 
credibility. The current dual approach by government to confront in-
ternal security challenges unrelated to terrorism and respond to terror-
ism is fraught with missteps in light of existing precedence in Africa and 
globally. These challenges are visible in three main ways. The first is in 
the elevation of counter-terrorism measures as a key component of 
internal security, which raises the stakes for the police in particular 
around security provisioning, accountability and the rule of law. Through 
this elevation, there is a conflation between responses to daily and 
opportunistic forms of insecurity, historical armed security challenges 
and terror related to groups such as Al Shabaab. In this conflation, the 
very groups that have fallen outside security provisioning are further 
alienated, through a retreat to profiling while measures to increase 
accountability are eroded. This occurs whilst increasing efficiency of a 
force that is institutionally weak. Current responses to counter terror 
have pointed to what was missing from the reforms debate —– the 
democratic governance of the security forces as a whole — demon-
strating an ultimate focus on human security. Debates around border 
control and immigration management have to a large extent occurred 
in isolation. The transnational nature of the Westgate siege and the 
need for the military intervention lifted the veil on the role of the KDF in 
internal security, the state of the intelligence service and what consti-
tutes Kenya's national security strategy.  
Second, a state security strategy framed by counter-terrorism as 
its centerpiece has the potential to mask larger human security ques-
tions that have plagued the country. Some of these human security 
questions include emboldened criminal networks that have evidence of 
the state's weak intelligence, action and deployment responses thereby 
taking advantage of these loopholes. They also encourage the creation 
of new response centres to respond to emerging threats such as the 
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counter-terrorism police unit, and the KDF's entry into the civilian arena 
to support the police force with limited civilian and parliamentary over-
sight over these forces. Resources and methods deployed towards 
fighting insurgent groups are deployed in the same way as dealing with 
admittedly violent criminals thereby threatening the justice chain, which 
include evidence gathering and management, core efforts towards 
security sector reform.  
Finally, there is need for national consensus and a legitimisation 
of the state's approach to national security as part of an accepted social 
contract. Legitimacy implies upholding the collective will of the people 
by operating within the confines of legal systems put in place, in this 
instance a constitution that worked hard to manage previous excesses 
of the executive in particular and its interference with the other arms — 
the legislature and judiciary. Ineffective communication by the state 
about who and what is the source of the problem has suggested that it 
oscillates between local opposition actors who aid and abet terror 
through dissent and the Somali community who alongside Muslim 
residents in the Coast are singled out as targets. Building national con-
sensus should logically lead to the willingness of citizens to cede certain 
freedoms in order for the state to effectively exercise the use of force. 
Ceding these rights requires that citizens trust the state to use force to 
the extent that is necessary to secure the country whilst ascertaining 
rights and freedoms of citizens.  
Endnotes 
1. For instance the Kenya Defence Forces have since their occupation of 
Southern Somalia been implicated as actors in the lucrative charcoal trade, 
which it is argued Al Shabaab relied on to fund their activities (See Ward 
2014) 
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